In this chapter the notion of principled autonomy is presented, and the perspective enabled by this notion is applied on the field of biobanking. Some consequences of the perspective of principled autonomy on aspects of biobank recruitment are discussed in relation to concepts of voluntariness, consent, and privacy. These discussions aim to focus on the fruitfulness of the notion of principled autonomy in bringing out the interconnectedness of the duties and rights of biobank participantsboth in general, and in a context of taking part in a research based universal health care system in particular.
2 samples for a biobank research project, I can make a decision all by myself, since I happen to own the blood in my veins. On the other hand, this picture emphasises the interpersonal aspect by making it the duty of the individual to govern her involvements with others -and vice versa: Since I own my blood, rather than it just being a part of my existence, I am supposed to control the uses to which it might be put. This way of answering the question of why biobank participants are to be respected leads to a discussion of how they are to be respected in terms of the aptness of different notions of ownership and control.
Another way of answering this question is in terms of a picture of a community of rational agents, in which the manipulation and coercion of any person would deny her rationality, and as such is incompatible with such a community. In this picture, individual control is linked to moral impartiality rather than to personal property. On the one hand, this picture emphasises the fact that every person should be respected as self-governing: If I am asked to provide blood samples for a biobank research project, I might make a good decision on my own, since I am an individual able to make reasonable choices. On the other hand, this picture downplays the personal -or privateaspect of governing oneself, by linking respect for an individual to the exercise of rationality in the sense of impartial decision-making. It is the aptness of such a picture for biobank research which is the subject matter of this chapter.
Principled autonomy
The perspective of Onora O'Neill on the assumption of rights is to emphasise that duties precede rights.
1 She argues that you cannot claim anyone's rights, without stating who has the duty to fulfil these rights. For instance, in order to claim the right to (better) healthcare, there might be a real sense that one ought to take part in sound health research, unless there are good reasons not to.
Current epidemiological research is a way to better healthcare tomorrow, from which anyone can benefit. O'Neill argues that the importance placed on autonomy in the bioethical debate, and the use of informed consent in medical practice, might "encourage ethically questionable forms of individualism and self-expression, and may heighten rather than reduce public mistrust in medicine, science and biotechnology." (O'Neill 2002:73) O'Neill thinks a better approach to securing sound ethical standards and the rights of the individual is to focus on obligations, because "(…) a right that nobody is required to respect is simply not a right." (O'Neill 2002:78) Rights and obligations are two sides of the same coin. Rights without corresponding obligations are illusions at worst, ideals at best.
To focus on obligations also brings out the relational nature of individual rights. It sheds light on 3 how our autonomy is embedded in social settings and institutions, and on how these can enable and disable the exercise of our autonomy.
O'Neill bases her account of autonomy on the Kantian notion of the concept. Kant defined the notion of autonomy as ethical, in addition to and distinct from its political origins.
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According to O'Neill, principled autonomy connects to a kind of self-legislation -to oblige oneself to be led by ethical reasoning. O'Neill quotes Allen Wood, suggesting that this will lead us to a dilemma: If we are somehow obligated by ourselves, does such an obligation amount to much? Is it logically possible to obligate oneself to anything? This seems to be just an illusion, on par with the invention of a game where I am the only one who ever know the rules. Or is it a description of the ideal of authenticity -our moral obligation to be true to ourselves? If we, on the other hand, say that this self-legislation is an obligation towards principles of reason that are somehow independent, does this not oblige us to accept the prevailing rationality, rather than my own will?
The Kantian notion of autonomy is based on obligations, O'Neill points out, and for her it negates the notion of This dilemma will be avoided, however, if autonomy is neither a private obligation nor a commitment to common thinking, but rather the fundamental principle of reason itself. We are reasoning if we make it possible for others to follow us -in thought and in action. In that case, autonomy is the principle by which it is possible to give reasons at all. In O'Neill's view, the fundamental requirements of an account of reason are "the necessary conditions that anyone who seeks to reason with others must adopt. As Kant sees it, principled autonomy is no more -but also no less -than a formulation of these basic requirements of all reasoning. (…) we must act on principles others can follow. So there is no gap between reason and principled autonomy, and specifically no gap between practical reason and principled autonomy in willing." (O'Neill 2002:92) Principled autonomy, then, requires us to act on principles that can be understood and acted on by anybody -in principle. Individual autonomy is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for principled autonomy. The notion of freedom involved here is freedom to act, independent of irrational influences. For Kant, causal independence -freedom from controlling impulses and plain coercion -is a more prominent condition for autonomy than social independence and self-4 expression. Principled autonomy requires mutual, and not just individual, understanding of the principles by which we guide our actions.
Universal moral principles and principles of reasoning are the essence of O'Neill's conception of autonomy. Realised principled autonomy implies a common understanding between researcher and participants, and thereby promotes involvement and non-maleficence in medical research. Demanding independence rather than reasons might have the paradoxical consequence of weakening rather than strengthening the ability of the individual to autonomously pursue her own interests.
Justifying consent by principled autonomy
Giving consent to become a patient or research participant based on principled autonomy is thus about preventing coercion and abuse, rather than about promoting personal autonomy. Autonomy should be seen to be a matter of adherence to moral principles, which is grounded in the autonomous recognition of these by the people concerned, and their mutual trust in each other to adhere to these principles. While autonomy as self-expression puts the emphasis on independent decision-making with reference to the (rights of the) individual, principled autonomy puts the emphasis on finding and acting from commonly accessible and assessable reasons. To justify informed consent requirements as the promotion of autonomy-based trust consequently seems to fit the principlistic conception better than the individualistic one. Informed consent justified by principled autonomy thus makes for legitimate biobank research recruitment in meeting both the demand of participants by promoting trust, and the demand of the Helsinki Declaration by securing informed and voluntary participation. Kant's Formula of Humanity 3 will fail to capture Kant's intention, if humanity is thought to be something more than the mere ability of rational agency. And, if autonomy is rightly understood as the Kantian duty to oneself to be rational, autonomy as the justification of elaborate informed consent procedures designed to secure the personal -but not necessarily rational -deliberation of others disappears. Kristinsson joins O'Neill in holding that justifying informed consent by Kantian autonomy means that "the ultimate point of informed consent policy is not to increase the incidence of personal deliberation but rather to decrease the incidence of manipulation, deception and coercion." (Kristinsson 2007:257) 4 To argue that the justification of informed consent should be viewed in terms of avoiding harm, rather than as promoting the personal autonomy of the individual, means that its main function is to waive specific rights of the individual. This means that the norms grounding these rights, rather than the exercise of individual autonomy, are the real basis for the normative significance of informed consent requirements, as argued by Manson and O'Neill: "Consent (…) can 6 be used to waive important norms, rules and standards, and so has considerable ethical importance.
But since its use always presupposes whichever norms are to be waived, it cannot be basic to ethics, or bioethics." (Manson and O'Neill 2007:149) This view emphasises the relationship between the negative obligations of researchers not to manipulate participants or violate their bodily integrity, and the rights which corresponds to these duties.
Autonomy, perfection and neutrality
Another aspect at play here is whether the justification of informed consent requirements as a promotion of individual autonomy is compatible with the basic principle of liberalism, namely that of securing the equality of all citizens by letting the right precede the good. A neutralist understanding of this principle would be that the state always should act in ways that are neutral between rival conceptions of the good, rather than to promote any(one's) particular and controversial conception of the good. The question is whether the emphasis on individual autonomy indeed can be given such a neutral justification, or if it is the promotion of the substantial conception of the good that is controversial.
A Millian kind of justification for advancing the autonomy of biobank participants seems to violate such a principle of neutrality. Rather than to respect a participant's right to handle his or her involvement with medical research as he or she wishes it seems to impose an ideal of personal autonomy that involves an obligation to approve of the relevant research. According to Mill, it is crucial that people are left alone to be able to exercise their liberty, because it is essential to selfrealization (Mill 1977:277) essential to promoting self-esteem and an ability to exercise mature choice (Mill 1977:277) and even essential to developing a more prosperous State. (Mill 1977:310) Kristinsson argues that the promotion of individual autonomy not only fails to fulfil the ambition of identifying how participants in medical research should be respected as individuals, but that the promotion of individual autonomy in a liberal society is in opposition to respecting participants as individuals. The reason for this is that personal autonomy is a substantive moral ideal that is not compatible with the liberal principle of neutrality, according to which state regulations such as informed consent requirements "should be acceptable to all citizens, regardless of their comprehensive conceptions of the good" (Kristinsson 2007 :258) Therefore, Kristinsson concludes, in order to respect individuals and the liberal principle of neutrality, a Kantian rather than a
Belmontian conception of autonomy is called for.
7
To respect individuals and to treat them as equals does not necessarily mean treating them without favouring any particular notion of the good, however. It can also be argued that it should take the form of treating them according to the notion of the good that is thought to be superior.
Liberal states often carry out attitude campaigns and economic incentives, numerous non-coercive but also non-neutral state policies in the form of public education. This aspect of the liberal state can be brought in accordance with the principle of neutrality if we distinguish a narrow neutrality principle from a comprehensive one.
5
Research participants and policy makers all agree that the relationship between the state and its citizens in a liberal society should not be based on blind trust and/or unrestricted rights to intervention and access to information about citizens, as this would open the door to totalitarianism and the loss of citizens' freedom from paternalism and domination. The notion of principled autonomy does not promote blind trust, but it might nevertheless be susceptible to being regarded as a conceptual variant of positive liberty; "as soon as the autonomous self of the individual begins to be equated with the rational self as such (shared by all rational agents), a slide into paternalism begins." (Kristjánsson 1996:142) A liberal perfectionist like Mill would argue that the promotion of a citizen's personal autonomy is essential to a liberal state. For the liberal perfectionist, respecting citizens as individuals is comprised of enabling the individual to deliberate on personal goals. It is not just to respect citizens through the shared obligations of principled autonomy, and to restrict state policies by the principle of neutrality.
In opposition to the comprehensive principle, which holds that state neutrality should extend both to the basic framework and the specific policies of the state, the narrow principle holds that neutrality is restricted to the constitutional structure of the state.
According to a narrow conception, the state can legitimately promote an ideal of individual autonomy in non-coercive ways, even if such an ideal is controversial.
In the Kantian conception of autonomy promoted by Kristinsson and O'Neill, an act is justified by the ability to back it with coherent rational and moral principles. In a Millian conception of autonomy, the moral obligation is comprised of the promotion of people's ability to develop and express their own character. The principlist emphasis on moral justification thus misses an important aspect, and makes it restrict itself to analysing the role of rationality in ascriptions of autonomy. 6 And the formal character of principled autonomy hands us a concept of autonomy that tends to presuppose rather than bring forth the way personal autonomy has certain substantial empirical conditions. 8
Trust and negatively informed consent
The perspective of principled autonomy emphasise the genuine trustworthiness of the institutions. The crux of the matter, however, is the tenability of Kihlbom's distinction between giving up autonomy and trusting others to make decisions for you. Kihlbom is correct in pointing out that , which indeed might be enhanced by someone else. He does not argue that autonomy in the end is merely of instrumental value, and as such might legitimately be overridden by the physician to promote a patient's real interest -namely his well-being. But holding that trusting others to promote your ends might enhance your autonomy implies that the instrumental value of autonomy is important.
"many of the means we use we are not familiar with. These states of ignorance do not threaten our autonomy." (Kihlbom 2008:148) Indeed, instead of saying that I must know all the health consequences of drinking the tea you are offering me, in order to make the autonomous choice to have tea with you, it is better to say that it is enough to have the well-grounded belief that you are not trying to poison me.
But this tells us something about the situations in which we employ the concept of autonomy, rather than about the relationship between autonomy and positive versus negative knowledge. Autonomous choices must be significant, and related knowledge -positive or negativemust be relevant to making such choices. Thus, neither general nor negatively informed consent is grounded in personal autonomy, if it entails that you leave significant decisions to others. If it does not, the consent is specific, since there are no further significant choices for the individual to autonomously decide.
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Now, if personal autonomy is promoted as an ideal, an individual should learn to see the personal significance of more choices. This creates a paradox in which participants see no problem in giving general consent, while the government pushes for more specific consent -because the participants should recognise that there are still significant choices to be made.
11

Authorisation and voluntariness
The perspective of principled autonomy emphasise the voluntariness of participants. In the case of biobank research, the unknown nature of future research projects and the significance of the findings for participants have, for instance, led the HUNT 12 biobank in Norway to make a kind of general consent with continuously updated information of the on-going research projects available to participants. In this way the dichotomy between specific and general consent is transcended through the introduction of the dimension of time: Consent becomes a continuous, rather than a one-time,
decision. This kind of consent could be called processual, or -as argued by Sigurdur Kristinsson and
Vilhjálmur Árnason -an authorisation.
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According to Kristinsson and Árnason, an authorisation will, in a system of trustworthy and transparent institutions, safeguard participants from manipulation, and make voluntary participation possible. They argue that to require specific consent would be ineffective, burdensome, and even present a privacy risk, while general consent fails to meet the moral motivations for consent. This distinguishes voluntariness from freedom: I might be free to leave an island, but since I will die if I try to get away by swimming, my decision to nevertheless stay on the island is non-voluntary, since no acceptable alternative is available.
Olsaretti's concept of voluntariness makes moral responsibility depend on voluntariness rather than freedom. I am not responsible for handing over money to a robber pointing at me with a gun, even if I am free to do so. But does the linking of moral responsibility to acceptable alternatives make acts done out of duty non-voluntary? If I am in a position to prevent a robbery in such a way that this is the only morally acceptable thing to do, do I do this non-voluntarily?
If that is the case, and moral responsibility depends on voluntariness, I am not responsible for acting in a morally laudable way. I just had to do it. Moreover, according to Ben Colburn, since I
am not responsible for my way of acting, it makes my act ineligible for moral praise. This is contraintuitive. This account, however, fits with the intuition that I am eligible to claim some kind of compensation for any damage to myself from the victim pointed out by the robber, again since I had to do it -I did not do it voluntarily. 
Patients' duties and privacy rights
The main potential for harm to biobank participants is not in terms of inappropriate physical invasions but in terms of inappropriate use of personal information. Such inappropriate use of information might be a matter of breaches of confidentiality that might lead to stigmatization, discrimination, and existential or familial complications. In the biobank context, it might also be a matter of proprietary privacy concerns regarding the kinds of research to which the information is put by the biobank researchers. It might be ethical concerns of the participants like avoiding research contrary to human dignity, or political concerns like promoting research for the benefit of special groups. It might also be economic concerns, if profits might be gained by the biobank in selling the information, or from products or services developed from research on the biobank information provided by the participants.
According to David Wendler "(…) involvement in research includes three distinct elements:
1. exposure to risks; 2. performance of research mandated behaviours; 3. contribution to answering a Biobank legislation in different countries qualifies the individuals' right to autonomy over biobank information by making specific uses of biobank information permissible in ways stated by law or with approval from research ethics committees. 16 Most often, however, the right to autonomy over biobank information must be waived by the individuals themselves in terms of giving their informed consent to placing the information at disposal for research purposes. When participation is mandatory, the element of immediate autonomy is no longer an issue, but the element of privacy remains. When consent is required, participants are asked to entrust their interest in or right to privacy to the biobank.
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What unites these ways of governing biobank research is the premise that the individual's contribution to the biobank is a private concern -even if its usage in biobank research is to generate de-identified data about various groups for the benefit of public health in general, with any feedback in terms of personal health information being given to the individual. The discussion about the legislation of biobank research in Norway is illustrates this. Such a change will in any case represent an erosion of professional secrecy, and of the principle that everyone should be able to control the use of any information about them. The fact that information conveyed in personal communication with the doctor is to be registered centrally, regardless of the wishes of the patients themselves, will create anxiety and insecurity for many patients. In evaluating the need for a change, one should take into consideration the possibilities for and consequences of the fact that some patients will fail to contact the health service, or will give incorrect information, out of fear that information might be passed on elsewhere. The registration might be counter-productive in realising its purpose, and this possibility must be kept in mind in assessing the need for an NPR identifiable by person.
There is no doubt that information about persons can be misused and that errors will occur, and the question now must be how soon and how often this will happen. The greater the The questions and concerns of the NDI are highly relevant for the regulation of biobank research. Provided that all research projects are subjected to thorough ethical scrutiny by the relevant ethics committee, the risk the participants most meaningfully can be said to run is that risk of their personal information being accidentally leaked and misused -they do not run the risk of the material being abused in otherwise unethical research projects. It is therefore ethically imperative to minimize the risk for information being leaked or used inappropriately, as this is one way to address both the principled and the empirical arguments mentioned by the NDI in their statement above. In order to promote the specific privacy interests of participants in biobank research, it is according to the perspective of principled autonomy important to situate and value these interests in their proper contexts. As pointed out by the NDI, this context might be ambiguous for a patient who relates both to his physician and to registry research by mandatory participation in the NPR.
The context here might, however, also be viewed as a relation between a participant in a universal health care system which offers medical treatment based on research. The right to receive medical care could then be argued to correspond to a duty to take part in the maintenance of the system.
In such a relation of mutual obligations, the relevant health information is private in the sense of confidential rather than in the sense of ownership. Rather than implying a duty to secure an interest of the individual of controlling this information, it implies a duty to secure that the information should be handled with respect, that it should not be passed on, and that it should be ensured that its usage does not adversely affect or otherwise compromise participants in the system.
The personal origin of any information is not a sufficient condition for requiring consent to any use made of it. As argued by Manson and O'Neill: "Where research is non-invasive, as in the case of secondary research using anonymised data that have already been legitimately obtained and stored, nothing is done to the 'research subjects' to whom these data pertain and it may be hard to establish a case for requiring informed consent." (Manson and O'Neill 2007:82) The relevant research here concerns group level phenomena rather than the health status of the individual. It might thus be viewed to be of no concern to individuals' rights of privacy at all. This would imply that to require the informed consent of the participants in these kinds of research must be justified by other concerns that a right to privacy.
Conclusion
Rather than just to provide the opportunity to promote their personal autonomy, informed consent was in this chapter regarded also as the means to respect biobank participants on the basis of principled autonomy. The negative purpose of informed consent in making participants able to avoid harm (or indeed to avoid research participation) was thereafter emphasised. The main aim of informed consent was in this perspective argued to be a legitimate way for biobank participants to be voluntary participants, and to waive rights to privacy. A crucial question raised by this perspective, however, is when and whether biobank participants have any privacy rights to be waived. The perspective of privacy endorsed here was that the nature of the information depends on the relation it is a part of, and how it is put to use. This in turn determines the rights and duties concerning the handling of the information. Regardless of whether the justification of consent is viewed as promoting the control over private information, or in terms of avoiding harm, the question becomes whether the information in the relevant context is to be regarded as private. And in the case of certain kinds of biobank research, it is possible to argue that the relevant relation and intention is such that biobank information is not of a private nature, and thus that the need for requiring consent for these kinds of biobank research falls away.
